Now showing items 1-4 of 4

    • Capital structure under collusion 

      Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka; Povel, Paul; Sertsios, Giorgio (Elsevier, 2021)
    • Capital structure under collusion 

      Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka; Povel, Paul; Sertsios, Giorgio (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2016)
      We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in ...
    • Whistleblowers on the board? The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions 

      Campello, Murillo; Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2015)
      Stock market reactions to news of cartel prosecutions are muted when indicted firms have a highproportion of independent directors serving on their boards. This finding is robust to self-selectionand is more pronounced ...
    • Whistleblowers on the board? The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions 

      Campello, Murillo; Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2017)
      Stock market reactions to news of cartel prosecutions are muted when indicted firms have a high proportion of independent directors serving on their boards. This finding is robust to self-selection and is more pronounced ...