Local non-bossiness

Duque-Rosas, Eduardo; Pereyra, Juan S.; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo

Local non-bossiness

dc.rights.license	Atribución 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Duque-Rosas, Eduardo
dc.contributor.author	Pereyra, Juan S.
dc.contributor.author	Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
dc.date.accessioned	2026-10-09T17:18:16Z
dc.date.available	2026-10-09T17:18:16Z
dc.date.issued	2026	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/3470
dc.format.mimetype	text/plain	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 236, 1-40	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	*
dc.title	Local non-bossiness	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106230	es
dc.type.version	Aceptada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her schoolmates while remaining at the same school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness and use it to provide a new characterization of DA that does not rely on stability. Furthermore, we show that local non-bossiness plays a crucial role in providing incentives to be truthful when students have preferences over their colleagues. As long as students have school-lexicographic preferences over colleagues—meaning that they first consider the school to which they are assigned and then their schoolmates—DA induces the only stable and strategy-proof mechanism. There is limited room to expand this preference domain without compromising the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.	es
dc.subject.keyword	School choice	es
dc.subject.keyword	Local non-bossiness	es
dc.subject.keyword	Student-optimal stable mechanism	es
dc.subject.keyword	Preferences over colleagues	es