Local non-bossiness and preferences over colleagues

Duque, Eduardo; Pereyra, Juan Sebastián; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Duque, Eduardo
dc.contributor.author	Pereyra, Juan Sebastián
dc.contributor.author	Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
dc.date.accessioned	2026-05-15T16:40:22Z
dc.date.available	2026-05-15T16:40:22Z
dc.date.issued	2024	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2833
dc.description.sponsorship	Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación FCE_1_2023_1_176072	es
dc.format.extent	26 p	es
dc.format.mimetype	text/plain	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Chile	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	Local non-bossiness and preferences over colleagues	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2406.01398	es
dc.type.version	Aceptada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is both stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her classmates while remaining in the same school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness and use it to provide a new characterization of DA that does not rely on stability. Furthermore, we show that local non-bossiness plays a crucial role in providing incentives to be truthful when students have preferences over their colleagues. As long as students first consider the school to which they are assigned and then their classmates, DA induces the only stable and strategy-proof mechanism. There is limited room to expand this preference domain without compromising the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.	es
dc.subject.keyword	School Choice	es
dc.subject.keyword	Local Non-bossiness	es
dc.subject.keyword	Student-optimal stable mechanism	es