Autor/es

Duque, Eduardo ; Pereyra, Juan Sebastián ; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo

Editor

Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía;Universidad de Chile

Fecha

2024

Extensión

26 p

Abstract

The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is both stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her classmates while remaining in the same school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness and use it to provide a new characterization of DA that does not rely on stability. Furthermore, we show that local non-bossiness plays a crucial role in providing incentives to be truthful when students have preferences over their colleagues. As long as students first consider the school to which they are assigned and then their classmates, DA induces the only stable and strategy-proof mechanism. There is limited room to expand this preference domain without compromising the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.

Keyword

School Choice Local Non-bossiness Student-optimal stable mechanism

Tipo de publicación

Documento de trabajo

Nivel de acceso

Abierto

Versión

Aceptada

Financiadores

Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación FCE_1_2023_1_176072

Colecciones

• Documentos de trabajo [82]