Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Dubra, Juan
dc.contributor.author	Figueroa, Nicolás
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-22T20:38:46Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-22T20:38:46Z
dc.date.issued	2016	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1349
dc.description.abstract	It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).	es
dc.format.extent	14 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Model	es
dc.subject	Pollution control	es
dc.title	Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide	es
dc.type	Documentos de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Dubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Figueroa, Nicolás. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es

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