Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide

Files in this item
Name:
Mechanism_Design_when_players_ ...
Size:
666.0Kb
Format:
PDF
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1349
Compartir
Exportar citas
Exportar a Mendeley
Estadísticas
Author
Editor
Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía
Date
2016
Extensión
14 p.
Abstract
It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).
Palabras claves
Tipo
Documentos de trabajo
Derechos
Abierto
Versión
Publicada
En
Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía
Collections
Show full item record

The following license files are associated with this item:

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional