Joint-liability vs. individual incentives in the classroom. Lessons from a field experiment with undergraduate student

Cid, Alejandro; Cabrera, José María

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Cid, Alejandro
dc.contributor.author	Cabrera, José María
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-01T19:58:29Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-01T19:58:29Z
dc.date.issued	2012	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1327
dc.description.abstract	We evaluate the impact of joint-liabilityincentives in the classroomusing a randomized field experiment.The instructor designsgroups of three studentsin the classroom and providesa premiumto their homework's gradeonly if all three members of the groupmeetsome requirements. To isolate the joint-liability effect from selfish motivations, we also design an individual incentives treatment. We find that joint-liabilityincentives impact positively on the grades attained in homework and midterm exams both in experimental coursesand in other courses taken by the students in the semester.Though the average positive effect seems to disappear in final exams, the overall impact of joint-liabilityincentives on the academic achievements in the semester is still positive. A drawback of this program is a decrease in classmate satisfaction. The significant effectiveness of the peer monitoring developed by joint-liability incentivesin a group providesnovelimplications for the design of grading policies in the classroom and for other social settings where incentives may be based in peer monitoring or joint liability.	es
dc.format.extent	27 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_06	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Field experiment	es
dc.subject	Rrandomization	es
dc.subject	Education	es
dc.subject	Joint liability	es
dc.subject	Student incentives	es
dc.title	Joint-liability vs. individual incentives in the classroom. Lessons from a field experiment with undergraduate student	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Cid, Alejandro. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Cabrera, José María. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es

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