Author

Benoit, Jean Pierre ; Dubra, Juan

Editor

Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía

Date

2011

Extensión

26 p.

Abstract

Many disasters are foreshadowed by insu¢ cient preventive care. In this paper, we argue that there is a true problem of prevention , in that insu¢ cient care is often the result of rational calculations on the part of agents. We identify two factors that lead to dubious e§orts in care. First, when objective risks of a disaster are poorly understood, positive experiences may lead to an underestimation of these risks and a corresponding underinvestment in prevention. Second, redundancies designed for safety may lead agents to reduce their care, resulting in a decrease in safety under certain conditions. We also analyze the use of checklists in accident prevention.

Palabras claves

Prevention Accidents Volunteerís dilemma Learning

Tipo

Documento de trabajo

Derechos

Abierto

Versión

Publicada

En

Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2011_11

Collections

• Documentos de trabajo [66]