Buscar
Mostrando ítems 1-2 de 2
Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide
(Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2016)
It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and ...
Getting polluters to yell the truth
(Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2006)
We study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from a series of industries when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism in which the regulator asks firms to ...