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Does the structure of the fine matter?

dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.contributor.authorCaffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.authorChávez, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorArdente, Analía
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-01T20:41:21Z
dc.date.available2022-04-01T20:41:21Z
dc.date.issued2013es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1329
dc.description.abstractWe study individual compliance behavior with respect to a legal norm in an experimental setting under two different regulatory instruments: emission standards and tradable pollution permits. Compliance to the same set of standards and expected permit holdings was induced with different structures of the fine schedule, namely: a linear and a strictly convex penalty function. Even though our design induces perfect compliance, we find that there are violations in both emissions standards and tradable permits systems, regardless of the penalty structure. Nevertheless, the extent of violations is affected by the penalty parameters under emissions standards, but not under a tradable pollution permits. Notwithstanding, we find that the penalty design has an effect on the average price of permits traded, its dispersion and the number of trades.es
dc.format.extent33 p.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economíaes
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2013_05es
dc.rightsAbiertoes
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectEnvironmental policyes
dc.subjectEnforcementes
dc.subjectPenalty structurees
dc.subjectEemissions standardses
dc.subjectEmissions tradinges
dc.subjectLlaboratory experimentses
dc.titleDoes the structure of the fine matter?es
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dc.contributor.filiacionCaffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.contributor.filiacionChávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepciónes
dc.contributor.filiacionArdente, Analía. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.type.versionPublicadaes

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional