Does the structure of the fine matter?

Ver ítem
Nombre:
working_paper_um_cee_2013_05.pdf
Tamaño:
429.6Kb
Formato:
PDF
Compartir
Exportar citas
Exportar a Mendeley
Estadísticas
Editor
Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía
Fecha
2013
Extensión
33 p.
Resumen
We study individual compliance behavior with respect to a legal norm in an experimental setting under two different regulatory instruments: emission standards and tradable pollution permits. Compliance to the same set of standards and expected permit holdings was induced with different structures of the fine schedule, namely: a linear and a strictly convex penalty function. Even though our design induces perfect compliance, we find that there are violations in both emissions standards and tradable permits systems, regardless of the penalty structure. Nevertheless, the extent of violations is affected by the penalty parameters under emissions standards, but not under a tradable pollution permits. Notwithstanding, we find that the penalty design has an effect on the average price of permits traded, its dispersion and the number of trades.
Tipo de publicación
Documento de trabajo
Nivel de acceso
Abierto
Versión
Publicada
En
Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2013_05
Colecciones

Licencia:

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Excepto si se señala otra cosa, la licencia del ítem se describe como Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional