The complementary of low taxes and pro-social guidelines when polluters have moral preferences

Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; López, Carolina; Murphy, James J.; Briozzo, Juan

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Chávez, Carlos
dc.contributor.author	López, Carolina
dc.contributor.author	Murphy, James J.
dc.contributor.author	Briozzo, Juan
dc.date.accessioned	2025-07-24T17:25:02Z
dc.date.available	2025-07-24T17:25:02Z
dc.date.issued	2025	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2743
dc.description.sponsorship	Funding for this study came from Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación (ANII), grants FCE_1_2019_1_156336 and POS_FCE_2020_1_1009209. Chávez acknowledges partial funding by ANID/FONDAP/1523A0007 and project Fondecyt Regular 1230266.	es
dc.format.extent	31 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	text/plain	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	The complementary of low taxes and pro-social guidelines when polluters have moral preferences	es
dc.type	Reporte técnico	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Talca, Chile	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	López, Carolina. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Murphy, James J. University of Alaska Anchorage, USA	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Briozzo, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.type.version	Aceptada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	We present the results of a series of public-bad laboratory experiments in which we assess whether a salient message suggesting pro-social behavior with an implicit moral appeal, and a tax that is insufficient to induce the optimal level of the externality, can complement each other when implemented jointly. Our results suggest that, on average, (a) behavior is consistent with subjects having moral preferences, (b) a salient message suggesting pro-social behavior can be effective, (c) preferences are nonseparable from the choice of instrument (i.e, the tax crowds-out part of the subjects´ moral preferences), and crucially, (d) the tax and the informative message do not complement each other. The tax has a greater impact on reducing the externality than the prosocial guideline, even though the tax was only half of that needed to reach the socially optimal level. Nevertheless, when implemented together, the total effect of both instruments is similar to that of the tax alone. This result is stronger for those subjects that are more “nudgeable” by the prosocial guideline. These results challenge the policy recommendation that nudges can effectively complement low taxes while awaiting the political will to raise them.	es
dc.subject.keyword	Economic experiment	es
dc.subject.keyword	Nudge	es
dc.subject.keyword	Prosocial guideline	es
dc.subject.keyword	Public bad	es
dc.subject.keyword	Tax	es

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