The effect of low Prices plus informative Nudges on externalities

Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; López, Carolina; Murphy, James J.

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Chávez, Carlos
dc.contributor.author	López, Carolina
dc.contributor.author	Murphy, James J.
dc.date.accessioned	2024-10-15T17:21:06Z
dc.date.available	2024-10-15T17:21:06Z
dc.date.issued	2024	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2648
dc.description.sponsorship	POS_FCE_2020_1_1009209	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	The effect of low Prices plus informative Nudges on externalities	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Talca, Chile	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	López, Carolina. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Murphy, James J. University of Alaska Anchorage, USA	es
dc.type.version	Borrador	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	We present the results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to study the effect of different policies to control negative externalities. The experiments consisted of a regulatory environment in which participants faced a uniform tax that is lower than optimal, a nudge, or a combination of a tax and a nudge. We consider a public bad with impacts among either the experiments participants or third parties who were not participants in the experiments. We test whether a descriptive message whose objective is to nudge behaviors towards the internalization of a public bad, implemented together with a tax that is insufficient to induce the optimal level of the externality, adds to the effect of the tax in reducing the negative externality. Our results suggest that the tax is more effective in reducing the level of production than the message. Also, adding a nudge (message) to the tax does not have an additional effect (in both, public bad inside and outside the lab scenarios). Finally, the combined effect of tax and message could be larger under the public bad outside the lab than in the public bad inside the lab scenario.	es
dc.subject.keyword	Economic experiment	es
dc.subject.keyword	Nudge	es
dc.subject.keyword	Public bad	es
dc.subject.keyword	Tax	es

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