Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?

Cantillon, Estelle; Chen, Li; Pereyra, Juan

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Cantillon, Estelle
dc.contributor.author	Chen, Li
dc.contributor.author	Pereyra, Juan
dc.date.accessioned	2024-10-02T18:37:02Z
dc.date.available	2024-10-02T18:37:02Z
dc.date.issued	2024	es
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2640
dc.format.extent	pp. 82-96	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	ScienceDirect	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 148, 82-96	es
dc.rights	Embargado	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Pereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012	es
dc.type.version	Aceptada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. Whenever there is a unique allocation that respects priorities, our condition captures all the environments for which DA is efficient. We show through stylized examples and simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient. We also discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings.	es
dc.subject.keyword	Matching	es
dc.subject.keyword	Envyfreeness	es
dc.subject.keyword	Fairness	es
dc.subject.keyword	Efficiency	es
dc.subject.keyword	Priorities	es
dc.subject.keyword	Preferences	es
dc.subject.keyword	Mutually best pairs.	es
dc.date.embargoEnd	2026-12-01	es

Ver ítem

2212.02881v3.pdf (829.2Kb )

license_rdf (805bytes )

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

Artículos [17]

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

Excepto si se señala otra cosa, la licencia del ítem se describe como Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional