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Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?

dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.contributor.authorCantillon, Estelle
dc.contributor.authorChen, Li
dc.contributor.authorPereyra, Juan
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-02T18:37:02Z
dc.date.available2024-10-02T18:37:02Z
dc.date.issued2024es
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2640
dc.format.extentpp. 82-96es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherScienceDirectes
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior, vol. 148, 82-96es
dc.rightsEmbargadoes
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.titleRespecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?es
dc.typeArtículoes
dc.contributor.filiacionPereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012es
dc.type.versionAceptadaes
dc.description.abstractenglishA classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. Whenever there is a unique allocation that respects priorities, our condition captures all the environments for which DA is efficient. We show through stylized examples and simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient. We also discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings.es
dc.subject.keywordMatchinges
dc.subject.keywordEnvyfreenesses
dc.subject.keywordFairnesses
dc.subject.keywordEfficiencyes
dc.subject.keywordPrioritieses
dc.subject.keywordPreferenceses
dc.subject.keywordMutually best pairs.es
dc.date.embargoEnd2026-12-01es

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional