The regulatory choice of noncompliance in the lab: effect on quantities, prices, and implications for the design of a cost-effective policy

Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Chávez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned	2024-06-12T20:03:05Z
dc.date.available	2024-06-12T20:03:05Z
dc.date.issued	2016	es
dc.identifier.issn	1935-1682	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2445
dc.format.extent	pp. 727-753	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	De Gruyter	es
dc.relation.ispartof	The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, vol. 16, n°2, 727-753	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	The regulatory choice of noncompliance in the lab: effect on quantities, prices, and implications for the design of a cost-effective policy	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Talca, Chile	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0202	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	Recent theoretical developments show the conditions under which it is cost-effective for the regulator to induce perfect compliance in cap-and-trade programs. These conditions are based on the ability that a regulator with perfect information has to induce the firms to emit any desired level with different combinations of the number of permits supplied to the market and the monitoring probability, assuming that firms are expected profit maximizers. In this paper, we test this hypothesis with a series of laboratory experiments. Our results suggest that firms may behave significantly different from what these models predict precisely when the different combinations of the supply of permits and the monitoring probability induce compliance versus noncompliance. More specifically, by allowing noncompliance in a manner consistent with theory, the regulator could produce a decrease in emissions and an increase in the market price of tradable permits that is not predicted by the theoretical models. The implications for the cost-effective design of environmental policy are discussed.	es
dc.subject.keyword	Emission standards	es
dc.subject.keyword	Emissions trading	es
dc.subject.keyword	Enforcement	es
dc.subject.keyword	Environmental policy	es
dc.subject.keyword	Laboratory experiments	es

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