Uncertain penalties and compliance

Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Luengo, Carol
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Chávez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned	2022-07-08T14:43:13Z
dc.date.available	2022-07-08T14:43:13Z
dc.date.issued	2019	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1372
dc.description.abstract	We present the results of a series of laboratory economic experiments designed to study compliance behavior of polluting firms when information on the penalty is uncertain. The experiments consist of a regulatory environment in which university students face emission standards and an enforcement mechanism composed of audit probabilities and penalties (conditional on detection of a violation). We examine how uncertainty on the penalty affects the compliance decision and the extent of violation under two enforcement levels: one in which the regulator induces perfect compliance and another one in which it does not. Our results suggest that in the first case, uncertain penalties increase the extent of the violations of those firms with higher marginal benefits. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertain penalties do not have any statistically significant effect on compliance behavior. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective design of emission standards should consider including public and complete information on the penalties for violations.	es
dc.format.extent	29 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Uncertainty	es
dc.subject	Penalty	es
dc.subject	Emission standard	es
dc.subject	Economic experiment	es
dc.title	Uncertain penalties and compliance	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Luengo, Carol. Universidad de Concepción	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Talca	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es

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