Whistleblowers on the board? The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions

Campello, Murillo; Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Campello, Murillo
dc.contributor.author	Ferrés, Daniel
dc.contributor.author	Ormazabal, Gaizka
dc.date.accessioned	2022-07-04T19:35:44Z
dc.date.available	2022-07-04T19:35:44Z
dc.date.issued	2017	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1360
dc.description.abstract	Stock market reactions to news of cartel prosecutions are muted when indicted firms have a high proportion of independent directors serving on their boards. This finding is robust to self-selection and is more pronounced when those directors hold more outside directorships and have fewer stock options — when they have fewer economic ties to the indicted firms. Results are stronger when independent directors’ appointments were attributable to SOX, preceded the CEO’s appointment, or followed class action suits — when they have fewer direct ties to indicted CEOs. Independent directors serving on indicted firms are penalized by losing board seats and vote support across their directorships in other firms. Moreover, firms with more independent directors are more likely to cooperate with antitrust authorities through leniency programs and to dismiss CEOs after cartel indictments. Our results show that cartel prosecution imposes significant personal costs onto independent directors and that they take actions to reduce those costs. Understanding these incentives is key for antitrust authorities in designing strategies for cartel prosecution.	es
dc.format.extent	47 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Cartel prosecution	es
dc.subject	Antitrust policy	es
dc.subject	Leniency programs	es
dc.subject	Independent directors	es
dc.subject	Reputational costs	es
dc.subject	Heckman selection test	es
dc.title	Whistleblowers on the board? The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Campello, Murillo. Cornell University	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Ormazabal, Gaizka. IESE Business School	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es

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