Uncertain penalties and compliance

Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Luengo, Carol
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Chávez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-20T18:03:00Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-20T18:03:00Z
dc.date.issued	2014	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1334
dc.description.abstract	Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator.Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense.	es
dc.format.extent	31 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2014_07	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Uncertainty	es
dc.subject	Risk	es
dc.subject	Compound risk	es
dc.subject	Fine	es
dc.subject	Emission standard	es
dc.subject	Economic experiment	es
dc.title	Uncertain penalties and compliance	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Luengo, Carol. Universidad de Concepción	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepción	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es

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