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Uncertain penalties and compliance

dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.contributor.authorLuengo, Carol
dc.contributor.authorCaffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.authorChávez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-20T18:03:00Z
dc.date.available2022-04-20T18:03:00Z
dc.date.issued2014es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1334
dc.description.abstractUsing a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator.Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense.es
dc.format.extent31 p.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economíaes
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2014_07es
dc.rightsAbiertoes
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectUncertaintyes
dc.subjectRiskes
dc.subjectCompound riskes
dc.subjectFinees
dc.subjectEmission standardes
dc.subjectEconomic experimentes
dc.titleUncertain penalties and compliancees
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dc.contributor.filiacionLuengo, Carol. Universidad de Concepciónes
dc.contributor.filiacionCaffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.contributor.filiacionChávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepciónes
dc.type.versionPublicadaes

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional