Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence

Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Chávez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-01T20:32:54Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-01T20:32:54Z
dc.date.issued	2012	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1328
dc.description.abstract	Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed.	es
dc.format.extent	34 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_07	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Environmental policy	es
dc.subject	Enforcement	es
dc.subject	Penalty structure	es
dc.subject	Emissions standards	es
dc.subject	Emissions trading	es
dc.subject	Laboratory experiments	es
dc.title	Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepción	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es

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