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Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence

dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.contributor.authorCaffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.authorChávez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-01T20:32:54Z
dc.date.available2022-04-01T20:32:54Z
dc.date.issued2012es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1328
dc.description.abstractRecent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed.es
dc.format.extent34 p.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economíaes
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_07es
dc.rightsAbiertoes
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectEnvironmental policyes
dc.subjectEnforcementes
dc.subjectPenalty structurees
dc.subjectEmissions standardses
dc.subjectEmissions tradinges
dc.subjectLaboratory experimentses
dc.titleComplementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidencees
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dc.contributor.filiacionCaffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.contributor.filiacionChávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepciónes
dc.type.versionPublicadaes

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional