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Anger and regulation
dc.rights.license | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional | * |
dc.contributor.author | Dubra, Juan | |
dc.contributor.author | Di Tella, Rafael | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-01T19:18:59Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-04-01T19:18:59Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | es |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1324 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study a model where agents experience anger when they see a firm that hasdisplayed insufficient concern for their clients' welfare (altruism) makes high profits.Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes inprices). Besides the standard channel (efficiency), regulation affects welfare through 2 channels: (i) regulation calms down existing consumers because a reduction in the proffits of an "unkind" firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger; and(ii) individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the firm is regulated. | es |
dc.format.extent | 35 p. | es |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | es |
dc.language | eng | es |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía | es |
dc.relation.ispartof | Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_03 | es |
dc.rights | Abierto | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | Public relations | es |
dc.subject | Commercial legitimacy | es |
dc.subject | Populism | es |
dc.title | Anger and regulation | es |
dc.type | Documento de trabajo | es |
dc.contributor.filiacion | Dubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay | es |
dc.contributor.filiacion | Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard Business School | es |
dc.type.version | Publicada | es |