Capital structure under collusion

Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka; Povel, Paul; Sertsios, Giorgio

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Ferrés, Daniel
dc.contributor.author	Ormazabal, Gaizka
dc.contributor.author	Povel, Paul
dc.contributor.author	Sertsios, Giorgio
dc.date.accessioned	2022-10-05T19:47:38Z
dc.date.available	2022-10-05T19:47:38Z
dc.date.issued	2021	es
dc.identifier.issn	1096-0473	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Elsevier	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 45, 100854	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	Capital structure under collusion	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854	es
dc.type.version	Aceptada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.
dc.subject.keyword	Capital structure	es
dc.subject.keyword	Financial leverage	es
dc.subject.keyword	Collusion	es
dc.subject.keyword	Cartels	es