Listar por autor "Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay"
Mostrando ítems 1-18 de 18
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Asignación de derechos de usufructo en mercados informales: evidencia desde las calles
Cabrera, José María; Cid, Alejandro (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2014)En el presente estudio, observamos los resultados deuna política de asignación masiva de derechos de usufructoa los cuidacoches, per-sonas que desempeñan –en la informalidad– tareas de vigilancia de ... -
Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2012)Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same ... -
Does the structure of the fine matter?
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2013)We study individual compliance behavior with respect to a legal norm in an experimental setting under two different regulatory instruments: emission standards and tradable pollution permits. ... -
Exposures to Particulate Matter from the Eruptions of the Puyehue Volcanoand Birth Outcomes in Montevideo, Uruguay
Balsa, Ana Inés; Caffera, Marcelo; Bloomfield, Juanita (National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, 2016) -
Getting polluters to yell the truth
Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2006)We study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from a series of industries when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism in which the regulator asks firms to ... -
Informe final del proyecto: Efectividad de incentivos económicos vs mecanismos para motivar la conducta pro-social en la internalización de externalidades. Una comparación usando experimentos económicos de laboratorio
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía., 2022)En esta investigación se desarrolló un modelo teórico y se desarrollaron y condujeron experimentos económicos de laboratorio con el propósito de evaluar hipótesis sobre la efectividad relativa de incentivos económicos ... -
Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide
Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan; Figueroa, Nicolás (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2016)It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and ... -
Modest and incomplete incentives may work: pricing plastic bags in Uruguay
Cabrera, José María; Caffera, Marcelo; Cid, Alejandro (Elsevier, 2021) -
Spatial spillovers in the implicit market price of soil erosion: an estimation using a spatio-temporal hedonic model
Caffera, Marcelo; Vásquez Lavín, Felipe; Rodríguez Anza, Daniel; Carrasco-Letelier, Leonidas; Hernández, José Ignacio; Buonomo, Mariela (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2019)We estimate the implicit market price of soil erosion, fitting a spatio-temporal hedonic price model using quarterly data of 3,563 agricultural farms traded in Uruguay between 2000 and 2014. A unique feature of our estimation ... -
The cost-effective choice of policy instruments to cap aggregate emissions with costly enforcement
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Springer, 2011) -
The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía (Taylor and Francis, 2021) -
The deterrence effect of linear versus convex penalties in environmental policy: laboratory evidence
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; Ardente, Analía (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2017)We study the individual compliance behavior of polluting firms in an experimental setting under two different penalty functions (a linear and a strictly convex) and two different regulatory ... -
The effect of low Prices plus informative Nudges on externalities
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos; López, Carolina; Murphy, James J. (Universidad de Montevideo, 2024) -
The effect of temporary and intense exposure to particulate matter on birth outcomes in Montevideo
Balsa, Ana Inés; Caffera, Marcelo; Bloomfield, Juanita (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2015)Background: Prior estimates of the correlation between ambient air pollutants’ concentrations and perinatal health show dispersion in magnitudes, as well as positive and negative signs. These differences may be partially ... -
The regulatory choice of noncompliance in the lab: effect on quantities, prices, and implications for the design of a cost-effective policy
Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (De Gruyter, 2016) -
The use of economic instruments for pollution control in Latin America: lessons for future policy design
Caffera, Marcelo (Cambridge University Press, 2011) -
Uncertain penalties and compliance
Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2014)Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis ... -
Uncertain penalties and compliance
Luengo, Carol; Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2019)We present the results of a series of laboratory economic experiments designed to study compliance behavior of polluting firms when information on the penalty is uncertain. The experiments consist of a regulatory environment ...