The cost-effective choice of policy instruments to cap aggregate emissions with costly enforcement

Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez, Carlos

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Chávez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned	2024-06-12T20:48:42Z
dc.date.available	2024-06-12T20:48:42Z
dc.date.issued	2011	es
dc.identifier.issn	1573-1502	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2446
dc.format.extent	pp. 531-557	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Springer	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 50, n°4, 531-557	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	The cost-effective choice of policy instruments to cap aggregate emissions with costly enforcement	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9481-y	es
dc.type.version	Aceptada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	We study the cost-e§ectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous Örms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-e§ectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the pollutersí abatement costs. Under perfect information we Önd that (a) the total cost-e§ective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are Örm speciÖc and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions. This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless, it is only with a system of tradable permits that is perfectly enforced with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty.	es
dc.subject.keyword	Environmental policy	es
dc.subject.keyword	Cost-effectiveness	es
dc.subject.keyword	Enforcement costs	es
dc.subject.keyword	Monitoring costs	es

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