Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

Pereyra, Juan S.; Silva, Francisco

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Pereyra, Juan S.
dc.contributor.author	Silva, Francisco
dc.date.accessioned	2024-06-12T17:20:31Z
dc.date.available	2024-06-12T17:20:31Z
dc.date.issued	2023	es
dc.identifier.issn	1555-7561	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2441
dc.format.extent	pp. 793-836	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Wiley	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Theoretical Economics, n° 18, 793-836	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Pereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Silva, Francisco. Deakin University	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5088	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent.The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent’s private information. The social planner is unable to use transfers to give incentives for agents to convey their private information. Instead, she is able to imperfectly verify their reports through signals that are positively affiliated with each agent’s type. We characterize mechanisms that maximize the social planner’s expected payoff. In the optimal mechanism, each agent chooses one of various tracks, which are characterized by two thresholds. If the agent’s signal exceeds the upper threshold of the chosen track, the agent receives a high-quality object, if it is between the two thresholds, he receives a low-quality object, and if it is below the lower threshold, he receives no object.	es
dc.subject.keyword	Probabilistic	es
dc.subject.keyword	Verification	es
dc.subject.keyword	Evidence	es
dc.subject.keyword	Mechanism design	es
dc.subject.keyword	Matching	es

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