Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment

Forteza, Álvaro; Mussio, Irene; Juan S., Pereyra

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Forteza, Álvaro
dc.contributor.author	Mussio, Irene
dc.contributor.author	Juan S., Pereyra
dc.date.accessioned	2024-06-10T19:58:19Z
dc.date.available	2024-06-10T19:58:19Z
dc.date.issued	2024	es
dc.identifier.issn	2214-8051	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2440
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Elsevier	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 108, 102128	es
dc.rights	Embargado	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.title	Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment	es
dc.type	Artículo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Forteza, Álvaro. Universidad de la República, Uruguay.	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Mussio, Irene. Leeds University Business School, United Kingdom	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Pereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102128	es
dc.type.version	Aceptada	es
dc.description.abstractenglish	If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful.	es
dc.subject.keyword	Political agency	es
dc.subject.keyword	Separation of powers	es
dc.subject.keyword	Checks and balances	es
dc.subject.keyword	Lab experiment	es
dc.date.embargoEnd	2026-03-01	es

Ver ítem

Canpoliticalgridlocunderminech ... (1.239Mb )

license_rdf (805bytes )

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

Artículos [17]

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

Excepto si se señala otra cosa, la licencia del ítem se describe como Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional