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Capital structure under collusion

dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.contributor.authorFerrés, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorOrmazabal, Gaizka
dc.contributor.authorPovel, Paul
dc.contributor.authorSertsios, Giorgio
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-27T18:54:45Z
dc.date.available2022-04-27T18:54:45Z
dc.date.issued2016es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1352
dc.description.abstractWe study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in leverage help increase cartel stability. Cartel firms have a surprisingly large economic footprint (they represent more than 20% of the total market capitalization in the U.S.), so understanding their decisions is relevant. Our findings show that anti-competitive behavior has a significant effect on capital structure choices. They also shed new light on the relation between profitability and financial leverage.es
dc.format.extent62 p.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economíaes
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economíaes
dc.rightsAbiertoes
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectCapital structurees
dc.subjectFinancial leveragees
dc.subjectFinancial policieses
dc.subjectCollusiones
dc.subjectCartelses
dc.subjectTrigger strategieses
dc.titleCapital structure under collusiones
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dc.contributor.filiacionFerrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.contributor.filiacionOrmazabal, Gaizka. IESE Business Schooles
dc.contributor.filiacionPovel, Paul. University of Houstones
dc.contributor.filiacionSertsios, Giorgio. Universidad de los Andeses
dc.type.versionPublicadaes

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