Getting polluters to yell the truth

Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Caffera, Marcelo
dc.contributor.author	Dubra, Juan
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-27T18:32:47Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-27T18:32:47Z
dc.date.issued	2006	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1350
dc.description.abstract	We study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from a series of industries when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism in which the regulator asks firms to report their abatement costs and implements the most stringent emissions standard consistent with the firms’ declarations. He also inspects one of the firms in each industry which declared the cost structure consistent with the least stringent emissions standard and with an arbitrarily small probability, he discovers whether the report was true or not. The firm is punished with an arbitrarily small fine if and only if its report was false. This mechanism is simple, is implementable in practice, its unique equilibrium is truth telling by firms, it implements the first best pollution standards and shares some features of the regulatory processes actually observed in reality.	en
dc.format.extent	19 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Efficient emissions standards	es
dc.subject	Command and control	es
dc.subject	Truth telling	es
dc.subject	Full nash implementation	es
dc.title	Getting polluters to yell the truth	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Dubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es