Autor/es

Caffera, Marcelo ; Chávez, Carlos

Editor

Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía

Fecha

2012

Extensión

34 p.

Resumen

Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed.

Palabras claves

Environmental policy Enforcement Penalty structure Emissions standards Emissions trading Laboratory experiments

Tipo de publicación

Documento de trabajo

Nivel de acceso

Abierto

Versión

Publicada

En

Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_07

Colecciones

• Documentos de trabajo [65]