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Joint-liability vs. individual incentives in the classroom. Lessons from a field experiment with undergraduate student

dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.contributor.authorCid, Alejandro
dc.contributor.authorCabrera, José María
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-01T19:58:29Z
dc.date.available2022-04-01T19:58:29Z
dc.date.issued2012es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1327
dc.description.abstractWe evaluate the impact of joint-liabilityincentives in the classroomusing a randomized field experiment.The instructor designsgroups of three studentsin the classroom and providesa premiumto their homework's gradeonly if all three members of the groupmeetsome requirements. To isolate the joint-liability effect from selfish motivations, we also design an individual incentives treatment. We find that joint-liabilityincentives impact positively on the grades attained in homework and midterm exams both in experimental coursesand in other courses taken by the students in the semester.Though the average positive effect seems to disappear in final exams, the overall impact of joint-liabilityincentives on the academic achievements in the semester is still positive. A drawback of this program is a decrease in classmate satisfaction. The significant effectiveness of the peer monitoring developed by joint-liability incentivesin a group providesnovelimplications for the design of grading policies in the classroom and for other social settings where incentives may be based in peer monitoring or joint liability.es
dc.format.extent27 p.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economíaes
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_06es
dc.rightsAbiertoes
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectField experimentes
dc.subjectRrandomizationes
dc.subjectEducationes
dc.subjectJoint liabilityes
dc.subjectStudent incentiveses
dc.titleJoint-liability vs. individual incentives in the classroom. Lessons from a field experiment with undergraduate studentes
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dc.contributor.filiacionCid, Alejandro. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.contributor.filiacionCabrera, José María. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguayes
dc.type.versionPublicadaes

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