Anger and regulation

Dubra, Juan; Di Tella, Rafael

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Dubra, Juan
dc.contributor.author	Di Tella, Rafael
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-01T19:18:59Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-01T19:18:59Z
dc.date.issued	2012	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1324
dc.description.abstract	We study a model where agents experience anger when they see a firm that hasdisplayed insufficient concern for their clients' welfare (altruism) makes high profits.Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes inprices). Besides the standard channel (efficiency), regulation affects welfare through 2 channels: (i) regulation calms down existing consumers because a reduction in the proffits of an "unkind" firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger; and(ii) individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the firm is regulated.	es
dc.format.extent	35 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_03	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Public relations	es
dc.subject	Commercial legitimacy	es
dc.subject	Populism	es
dc.title	Anger and regulation	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Dubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard Business School	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es