On the viability of a multilateral trade agreement: a political-economy approach

Trupkin, Danilo

dc.rights.license	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.contributor.author	Trupkin, Danilo
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-16T18:31:21Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-16T18:31:21Z
dc.date.issued	2010	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1304
dc.description.abstract	The big picture issue this paper intends to address is on the incentive aspects of a multilateral trade liberalization. The paper builds on a framework originally introduced in Grossman and Helpman’s The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements (1995). The aim of that work was to explain the viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) between two countries in a political-economy framework. A simple extension to a three-country setting allows us to analyze whether FTAs are “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs”. An illustration with specific functional forms serves to find conditions under which FTAs are, somehow, partial building blocs, i.e., a bilateral liberalization can be feasible when multilateral liberalization is not.	es
dc.format.extent	24 p.	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía	es
dc.relation.ispartof	Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2010_02	es
dc.rights	Abierto	es
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	International Trade	es
dc.subject	Free-Trade Agreements	es
dc.subject	Multilateral Trade Agreement	es
dc.subject	Political-Economy	es
dc.title	On the viability of a multilateral trade agreement: a political-economy approach	es
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es
dc.contributor.filiacion	Trupkin, Danilo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay	es
dc.type.version	Publicada	es